(" The appropriate question is whether courts have (and whether they ought to have) an obligation to apply the Fourth Amendment to new technologies that could invade privacy without physically trespassing on anyone's private property. Kerr answers this question no .... " ); id. at 888-89 (arguing that my analysis would find no constitutional limitations on the use of a hypothetical "brain wave recorder"); id. at 893-94 (arguing that an originalist should interpret the Fourth Amendment as protecting privacy instead of property); id. at 901 (describing my normative position as "Kerr's argument that Congress alone should be entrusted with protecting privacy"). 2000) ("Assuming, as defendant contends, that the facility and means used in this case was a computer with a modem connected via phone lines to the internet, the court concludes that this would clearly be a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to permit Congress to regulate it.").
12. See, e.g., United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 1999 ) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) under the Commerce Clause). 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a) (4) (B) (2000) makes it a felony crime to knowingly possess[] 1 or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter which contain any visual depiction that has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which was produced using materials which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer, if -(i) the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and
(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct .... As a descriptive matter, however, I am not convinced that this is true.
Id. (emphasis added
It seems to me that both statutory and constitutional privacy protections on average tend toward a middle ground. Supreme Court decisions establishing strong Fourth Amendment protection tend to be followed by other decisions that temper the initial rule. For example, the Supreme Court's expansion of the exclusionary rule to the States in Mapp v. Ohio 16 was followed by a series of decisions minimizing the scope of exclusion, both through good-faith exceptions for warrants17 and new exceptions to the warrant requirement.18
Perhaps Katz itself is an example: the promise of broad protection in Katz was followed by a series of cases construing it narrowly. Through repeated case-by-case decisions, the courts eventually work their way toward some sort of middle ground level of protection. (2000), raised the threshold for obtaining pen register orders, see H.R. 5018 § 4, imposed a warrant requirement on cell phone location information, see H.R. 5018 § 7, and extended the warrant requirement from only unopened email to protect all email, see H.R. 5018 § 13. This change in direction scuttled the bill: privacy advocates were skeptical because the bill contained some pro-government measures and had been supported by the Clinton Administration, and law-enforcement interests opposed the bill because on the whole it represented a substantial shift toward greater regulation of law enforcement.
21. Consider Swire's discussion of ho w the law should respond to changes in technology as telephone communications are routed over the Internet. Here he fo cuses on ho w advancing technology lessens privacy under the assumption of stable legal rules. See Swire, supra note 3, at 910-15. 28. See U .S . CONST. art I, § 7. [Vol. 102:933 than reduce them. This dynamic allows· presidents to use threats of vetoes (and in unusual cases, vetoes themselves) as tools to block legislative enactments that law enforcement interests view as threatening. If, over time, the veto threat creates an institutional bias in legislation in favor of law-enforcement interests, that may create an important role for the judiciary to play. In effect, the judicial branch could act as a counter to the executive branch; while a President could use the veto power to nullify legislation that excessively narrows executive power, the courts could use their power of judicial review to nullify legislation that excessively broadens it.
One interesting way in which the courts might respond to this dynamic is through statutory rather than constitutional interpretation. There is a history supporting just such an approach. Consider the Supreme Court's pro-privacy reading of the first permanent federal wiretapping statute, Section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 . 29
As a textual matter, Section 605 appears to be only a criminal prohibition on private wiretapping; it says nothing about wiretapping by government agents or remedies beyond criminal punishment. In 1937 , however, the Court interpreted the law in Nardone v. United States3° to apply to federal officers and also to serve an evidentiary function: according to the Court, the statute made all wiretapping evidence inadmissible in federal court.31 The Court relied in part on policy considerations:
For years controversy has raged with respect to the morality of the practice of wire-tapping by officers to obtain evidence. It has been the view of many that the practice involves a grave wrong. In the light of these circumstances we think another well recognized principle leads to the application of the statute as it is written so as to include within its 34. Id. at 341. This case introduced the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine later adopted in the Fourth Amendment context: "[T]he trial judge must give opportunity, ho wever closely confined, to the accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the poisonous tree." Id. According to Swire, judges can overcome their institutional difficulties through the use of expert testimony, review of opinion polls, and a close study of relevant statutory privacy laws.43 None are likely to be helpful. To the extent that Swire imagines judges trying to identify and match constitutional protections to majoritarian preferences, it is unclear why we cannot leave such matters to the elected branches.
Expert testimony is unlikely to help much because most Fourth Amendment questions arise in the context of a motion to suppress, rather than a civil trial between well-financed adversaries. Defense attorneys will only rarely find it worthwhile to educate a judge about a technology, and judges will only rarely think that they need to be so 43. See Swire, supra note 3, at 924.
CONCLUSION
In my article, I predict that we may be moving toward a bifurcated regime in which privacy rights in traditional cases are constitutional but rights in developing technologies are largely statutory. This is an easy prediction to make in some ways, for it is a fairly accurate description of the law today. Professors Swire and Colb each want the courts to reinvigorate the Fourth Amendment, and argue that the courts must and can assume a vigorous role regulating the use of emerging technologies. Whether the courts follow a bold or more modest path, I hope both Colb and Swire will agree that in the foreseeable future Congress will continue to play an essential role.
Whatever balance is struck between constitutional and statutory privacy, we should recognize that statutory laws should not remain an afterthought. If scholars wish to remain relevant to the law in action, we should focus on Congress and appreciate the possibilities of statutory law as a source of privacy protection in new technologies.
